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Summary
This paper presents a model of the interaction between a (potential) injurer and a
(potential) victim. In combining the analyses oftort law and dispute resolution, one
can investigate how the behaviour of a (potential) injurer is influenced by the fact
that he may anticipate the outcome of a judicial dispute. Inefficiencies may result
for several reasons. We focus on the role of legal costs. These costs constitute an
inefficiency in itself. Furthermore, the level of legal costs may prevent a victim
from making a credible threat to bring suit, implying that the injurer can engage in
a harmful activity without any risk. This problem may be relieved by profit-seeking
companies selling legal cost insurance policies to (potential) victims of harmful
activities. We investigate why risk-neutral individual might be interested in legal
cost insurance. The consequences for the interaction between potential injurer and
victim and for efficiency are analysed.
Department of Economics, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9521,2300 RA
Leiden, The Netherlands.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The economic analysis of tort law studies the influence of liability on the level of
care taken by an injurer (and the victim in bilateral cases) and on the number of
activities.! It is generally assumed that an individual who, given the operative
system of liability, is obliged to pay damages will actually pay. Models of dispute
resolution, however, suggest that these damages will not always be paid. In
combining the analyses of tort law and dispute resolution, one can investigate how
the behaviour of a potential injurer is influenced by the fact that he may anticipate
the outcome of a judicial dispute. In doing so, one may gain insight in the
implications of dispute resolution for the deterrent function of the law.
In a number of papers the analysis of tort law has been combined with what
Shavell (1995) calls "the standard model of litigation" .2 In these papers the analysis
is focused on the question of how the choice of the level of care is influenced by
the outcome of a potential dispute. In this, it is implicitly assumed that the injurer
will always engage in his activity. 3 The analysis in the present paper, on the other
hand, assumes that the activity can be performed with one specific level of care
only, and investigates whether a potential injurer does or does not engage in his
activity, depending on the prospective outcome of an eventual dispute. The
interaction between a (potential) injurer and a (potential) victim will be modelled
in terms of four possible scenario's: (I) the injurer engages in his activity and the
victim cannot (credibly threaten to) bring suit; (11) the injurer engages in his
activity and the dispute ends in a settlement; (Ill) the injurer engages in his activity
and the dispute ends in a trial; (IV) the injurer refrains from his activity. In the
evaluation of the result of the interaction two types of inefficiency will be
distinguished. The first type regards the number of activities, as the potential
The standard reference is Shavell (1987).
2 Seminal papers on the standard model of litigation are Landes (1971), Gould
(1973), Posner (1973) and Shavell (1982). Recent analyses based on the standard model
are Smith (1992) and Shavell (1995). Because the answer to the question of whether a
dispute will result in a settlement or a trial in the standard model depends on the parties'
subjective probabilities of prevailing, this type of model has been called "optimism
model". This in contrast to the so-called "private information models", where the
emergence of trial depends on private information and related strategic behaviour. See
P'ng (1983) and Bebchuk (1984). Waldfogel (1998) presents some evidence on litigation
that is consistent with the standard model rather than the private information model.
3 Papers dealing with the implication of disputes for the level of care but not for the
number of activities are Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988), Hylton (1990), Miceli and
Segerson (1991), Gravelle (1993), Gravelle and Waterson (1993), and Shavell (1997).
Shavell (1997) interprets the deterrent effect that suit has on the exercise of precaution as
a positive externality of litigation. There is also a negative externality, since a party that
makes a litigation decision does not take into account the legal costs that he induces on
others. Consequently, the level of litigation can be either socially excessive or inadequate.
2injurer may engage in an inefficient activity or refrain from an efficient one. The
second type regards the method of dispute resolution, as a dispute may result in a
costly trial.
The analysis starts from the standard European practice, where contingent
fees are absent and the so-called Continental rule for allocating legal costs applies,
i.e. the loser in a trial not only has to pay his own, but also the winner's legal
costs. It will become apparent that inefficient outcomes may arise in several
situations. The paper then specifically addresses one source of inefficiency, i.e. the
presence of legal costs. The level of legal costs may withhold citizens from taking
legal proceedings, either due to a binding credit restriction or because the expected
net benefit from litigation is negative. This problem may be relieved by profit-
seeking companies selling legal cost insurance policies to (potential) victims of
harmful activities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a model of the
interaction between a (potential) injurer and a (potential) victim. We evaluate the
outcome in terms of efficiency. In section 3, we discuss the implications of legal
cost insurance. We investigate (a) the behavioural consequences if the (potential)
victim is insured; (b) why risk-neutral individuals may be interested in legal cost
insurance in the first place; (c) the implications for efficiency; and (d) the
differences between private and public legal cost insurance. Section 4 concludes.
2 HARM, TRIAL AND SETTLEMENT
2.1 The model
In this section we present a model of the interaction between two individuals, a
(potential) injurer A and a (potential) victim B. Both will be taken to be risk-
neutral. At a certain point in time individual A considers whether or not he should
venture upon an activity that will bring him a personal gain. However, that same
activity causes harm to individual B. The legal rule is supposed to be one of strict
liability. If harm occurs, victim B will want to hold the injurer liable and receive
damages, so he will threaten A to litigate. If this threat is credible, A has to decide
whether or not he will make a settlement offer that is high enough to be acceptable
for B. If A does not make an acceptable settlement offer, B will bring the dispute
to trial. Then, whether it is wise for A to engage in the activity after all, depends
on his personal gain from the activity, corrected for the expected costs of
compensatory damages and the expected costs of a legal procedure. The game tree
in figure 1 depicts the structure of the model.
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In order to decide whether or not to engage in the activity, the potential injurer has
to answer three questions:
1. If I engage in the activity and the activity causes harm to a victim, can the
victim credibly threaten to litigate?
2. In case the victim credibly threatens to litigate, what is the best option:
making a settlement offer which is acceptable to the victim or allowing
things to develop into a trial?
3. What is, given the answers to question 1 and 2, the best alternative: to
engage or not to engage in the activity?
Ad. 1 Can the victim credibly threaten to litigate?
To formalize the model, we first assume that individual A has caused harm H, H
> 0, to victim B. In case of harm, B will consider whether it is worthwhile to start
a litigation procedure. B' s subjective probability of success in a trial is denoted by
Pa, °~ Pa ~ 1. IfB prevails in the trial, individual A has to fully compensate harm
H. Furthermore, under the Continental rule, the loser in a trial not only has to pay
his own legal costs, but also those of the winner. Total legal costs are given by C
= CA + Ca, where CA and Ca denote the legal costs made by A and B,
respectively; CA > 0, Ca > 0. Then, individual B's expected net benefit of
litigation, indicated by La, is equal to:
(1)
Assuming the injurer knows Pa' Hand C, victim B can credibly threaten A to
litigate if and only if La > 0, i.e. iff Pa > C/(H +C).
4Ad. 2 Settlement or trial?
If the activity causes harm and the victim's net benefit of litigation is positive, A
must face the eventuality that parties will end up in court. Let A's subjective
probability of prevailing in court be equal to PA> 0 ::;; PA::;; 1. When A prevails, he
will be exempt from paying damages and his legal costs will be reimbursed by B.
But when he loses, he has to compensate victim B for his harm H and for his legal
costs CB; moreover, he then has to bear his own legal costs CA' Consequently, A's
expected cost of litigation, indicated by LA> is given by:
(2)
Instead of waiting for the judge to give his final verdict in court, A can also try to
start a bargaining process with B in order to settle the dispute out of court. It can
be assumed that this settlement bargaining takes place before the bulk of the legal
costs has been incurred; for simplicity we shall assume that the costs associated
with bargaining and settlement are zero. 4 Suppose A is considering the possibility
of a settlement, what amount should he then offer to victim B? It is clear that
individual B will only be ready to accept a settlement offer by A, if it makes him
at least as well off as a trial. This implies that a settlement offer to be acceptable
to B should at least be equal to his expected net benefit of litigation LB, as given by
(1). A "low" settlement offer, Slow < LB, will be rejected by the victim, because
the expected payoff of rejecting (LB- H) exceeds the payoff of accepting (Slow-H);
cf. figure 1. A "high" settlement offer, Shigh 2 LB, will be accepted by the victim,
because the payoff of accepting (Shigh- H) is at least as good as the payoff of
rejecting (LB- H).
As to injurer A, rationality prescribes that he does not pay more than the
minimum amount that is required.5 Hence, in case of a settlement injurer A will
pay victim B a settlement amount, indicated by S, equal to:
4 The analysis is not affected by this assumption, as long as these costs are smaller
than the legal costs associated with a trial.
5 In the literature it is generally assumed that the settlement amount is somewhere
halfway the settlement range, in between the minimum the victim wants to receive and the
maximum the injurer is willing to pay. That assumption, however, is not appropriate for
our model, given its decision structure. After injurer A has made his (final) settlement
offer, victim B must decide whether or not the dispute will go to trial. If B does not accept
the (final) settlement offer, he ends up with La. So, injurer A can be confident that victim
B will not decide to reject a settlement offer S = La, as B cannot improve his position by
going to court.
5(3)
Injurer A has to decide whether or not he will make a settlement offer that is high
enough to be acceptable for B. A will not make an acceptable offer, and allow
things to develop into a trial, if and only if LA < S, i.e. iff PA + PB > 1 +
C/(H +C). If LA ~ S, A will aim for a settlement by offering individual B the
amount S.
Ad. 3 To do or not to do?
We now return to individual A's initial question, whether it is interesting enough,
taking account of the possible consequences, to engage in the activity after all. The
personal gain of the activity itself to individual A is denoted by G. It is taken for
granted that G > 0; otherwise it would not be interesting for A to even consider
the activity. Once individual A starts the activity, individual B will suffer harm H. 6
A's expected net benefit ofthe activity then not only depends on G, but also on the
consequences of B's possible reaction to any harm. Can B really be expected to
litigate? And if so, what then is A's subsequent best response, making a settlement
offer which is acceptable to the victim, or allowing things to develop into a trial?
We discuss the three possibilities one at a time.
If victim B cannot credibly threaten to litigate, individual A does not have
to fear for paying damages or incurring legal costs. The expected net benefit of the
activity is equal to G, which is positive by assumption. So, A will definitely start
the activity.
If individual B can credibly threaten to litigate in case of harm, and a
settlement is the least expensive option for A, his expected net benefit of the
activity is given by G - S. A will be interested in the activity if the expected net
benefit, G - S, is positive, Le. iff PB < (G+C)/(H +C). When G - S ~ 0, A will
be better off by abstaining from the activity.
If, on the other hand, (waiting for) a trial should be A's best response to a
credible threat by B to file suit in case of harm, his expected net benefit of the
activity is equal to G - LA' A will then start the activity as long as G - LA > 0,
Le. iff PA> 1 - G/(H +C). Otherwise, that is if G - LA ~ 0, A will abstain from
the activity.
6 It may be more realistic to assume that nature decides with a probability 1t, 0 <
1t :s; 1, whether individual B suffers harm as a result of A's activity. Since this doesn't
yield any additional insights, we present the case where 1t = 1.
6The findings from the model are summarized in figure 2. Area I comprises the
cases where individual B cannot credibly threaten to litigate; in these cases A will
always engage in the activity. For the cases in area 11 and Ill, engaging in the
activity leaves individual A, on balance, with a positive net benefit; in these cases
individual A engages in the activity and makes a settlement payment (area 11) or
allows a trial to develop (area Ill). Area IV comprises those cases where, given the
costs associated with a prospective trial or settlement, A decides not to engage in
the activity.
Figure 2. Outcomes ofthe interaction between A and B
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2.2 Efficiency
Two types of inefficiency may be discerned. The first one regards the number of
activities. An inefficiency of this type obtains if an injurer engages in an inefficient
activity, where the harm to the victim outweighs the personal gain to the injurer
(G < H). But there is also an inefficiency if an injurer abstains from an efficient
activity, where the personal gain to the injurer surpasses the harm to the victim (G
> H). The second type of inefficiency regards the method of dispute resolution.
When a dispute ends up in a trial, the legal costs involved (C) imply a welfare loss.
In a first-best world, all activities with G> H will take place, without ever
resulting in a trial, and all activities with G <H will be effectively deterred. In a
second-best world, not all activities with G < H will be deterred, and some
activities will actually lead to a trial. In this second-best world, an activity with
G > H on balance may result in a welfare loss, if the activity leads to a trial and
C > G - H.
7Using figure 2, we can take stock of the welfare implications of the
interaction between A and B in the present model setting. As to the first type of
inefficiency, it can immediately be seen from figure 2b that an efficient activity will
always take place. However, as areas I, 11 and III of figure 2a point out, an
inefficient activity will not always be refrained from. The second type of
inefficiency may also occur, as is apparent from the presence of an area III in both
figure 2a and 2b.
Of course, to what extent both types of inefficiency will obtain, and the size
of the eventual welfare losses involved, depend on the actual distribution of PAand
PB across the 0-I-square.7 From figure 2 it immediately follows that the
contribution to social welfare W of an activity with given values of G, H, and C
can formally be represented by:
W(G,H,C) =
H(G-H) f(PAlPB) dPAdPB + H(G-H-C) f(PA'PB) dPAdPB + Ho f(PAlPB) dPAdPB
area area area
IP m IV
where f is the density function of the distribution of PAand PBacross the 0-1-
square. Summing over all the possible activities with their various values ofG, H,
and C, taking account of their distribution, then gives total social welfare that is
generated by the system of tort law and dispute resolution studied.
The first way in which the law influences the efficiency of the interaction between
a potential injurer and a victim is through (the distribution of) the probabilities to
prevail, PAand PB. There is a simple rule that always yields an efficient outcome:
assure that A and B can be certain that B will prevail if he has suffered harm and
brings suit against A. When PA = 0 and PB= 1, it follows from the lower right-
hand corner of figure 2a that individual A will abstain from any activity where G
< H; and if G > H, individual A will engage in the activity, and settle the case
by paying an amount equal to H if the activity inflicts harm to the victim. It is,
however, hardly conceivable that this "simple rule" can be realized, since the
outcome of litigation depends on a decision of the court. In the actual world of
imperfect information, parties may provide the court with incomplete information
on the relevant aspects of a case, either because it is costly to secure all the details,
or because it may be helpful to their stand if the information is coloured. The court
7 It may be noted that these findings comply with Shavell's (1997) observations on
the divergence between the private and the social motive to litigate.
8may then have problems in interpreting the available information on the kind of
activity, the harm, the causation and the liability in a case. This is aggravated by
the rule of law, which is formulated in very general terms so as to cover many
different separate cases. For each case it has to be judged anew whether, in view
of the available information and the precedents, it fits the rule. As a consequence
it is not at all straightforward and common knowledge in which party's favour the
court will decide. But when the values of PA and PB are not restricted to the lower
right-hand corner of the O-I-square, inefficiencies appear to be unavoidable in
practice.
There is still more to say about the consequences of PA and PB' Notice that
in this kind of model there can only be a trial if the parties collectively overestimate
their chances. For a case to be in area Ill, it must hold that PA + PB > I +
Cl(H +C). It follows that the inefficiency associated with dispute resolution through
a trial can be avoided if the position of the injurer and the victim are clear enough
to avoid too much optimism.
The law also affects efficiency through the height of the legal costs which, together
with the values of the case-specific parameters G, and H, is determining the
position of the border lines between the areas I-IV in figure 2. An increase in legal
costs, for instance, lowers the expected net benefit of litigation of the plaintiff, cf.
(I), and raises the expected cost of litigation of the defendant, cf. (2). As a result
of this, a victim's threat to bring suit will more often be incredible, while striving
for a settlement is made more attractive for the injurer. Graphically, an increase in
C leads to upward and rightward shifts of the border lines between the areas I - IV,
which produces an increase of area I and a decrease of area Ill; the impact on the
size of areas 11 and IV depends on the circumstances. Because process law affects
the size of the areas in figure 2, it also influences efficiency. An increase in legal
costs definitely lowers the number of procedures that end up in court. The
concomitant positive contribution to social welfare may, however, be counteracted
by the increase in legal costs itself, and by any raise in the number of inefficient
activities taking place.8
The latter depends on what happens to the size of area IV, given that forces are
at work in different directions. As for the increase in legal costs itself, this of course only
implies a welfare loss if more and/or more valuable resources are being employed. Notice
that an increase in legal costs for the parties might also be the result of government raising
its tariffs for the entrance into court, when these tariffs did not cover all the relevant costs
in the first place.
9Thus far we argued that B' s threat to bring suit against A will be credible if his
expected net benefit oflitigation is positive, Le. iff PBH - (1- PB)C > O. Given PB
and H, the expected net benefit will turn negative if C is too high. But there is also
another problem related to the height of legal costs. If B prevails, his legal costs
will be restituted by A. This restitution takes places after the court has passed
judgment. Until then, B will have to pay his legal costs in advance. The problem
now is that he may be unable to do so because of a liquidity and credit restriction.
Such a restriction obtains if B is a lower income citizen, who does not have much
money in cash or on his bank account, and who cannot lend because of poor
collateral. In such a case A can enter into his (potentially) harmful activity without
any risk that he will be sued for damages. Without the introduction of an
arrangement that effectively reduces the financial barrier for the victim to bring
suit, the result will be inefficiency.
3 LEGAL COST INSURANCE9
The problem that the level of legal costs may withhold citizens from taking legal
proceedings, either due to a binding credit restriction or because the expected net
benefit from litigation is negative, may be relieved by profit-seeking companies
selling legal cost insurance policies to potential victims of harmful activities. The
frequency with which each citizen is actually receiving harm that is so serious that
it eventually brings him into a court-room, is on average rather low. One could
then imagine private insurance companies charging an annual premium of a very
reasonable size, that would be affordable to virtually anyone, and thus might help
to remove the credit restriction of lower income citizens.
The discussion of legal cost insurance in this section will take four steps.
First, we shall amend our model, by assuming that the (potential) victim is insured.
Second, we reconsider whether the effects are such that ex ante potential victims
will be interested enough to buy the insurance, and profit-seeking companies will
be interested enough to make the insurance available. Third, we discuss the
implications for efficiency. Finally, we compare private legal cost insurance with
a public approach.
9 This section is inspired by Kirstein (1998). His paper, however, does not consider
the level of activities, but studies the interaction between the injurer and the victim when
either/neither/both of them can buy legal cost insurance. Moreover, in equilibrium no
trials take place at all.
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3.1 The impact of legal cost insurance in the model
Let us assume that individual B has accepted an offer from a private insurance
company to buy a legal cost insurance policy with a premium I. The premium I for
the moment represents a sunk cost for B. Whenever B gets harmed by the activities
of anyone else, he can call on his insurance company; any legal costs that are
charged to him will be paid for by the insurance company.
Given this system of legal cost insurance, we investigate the interaction
between A and B, following the three questions of section 2.
1. Individual B can credibly threaten to bring suit if his expected net benefit
of litigation LB = PBH is positive, i.e. iff PB > O.
2. IfB credibly threatens to litigate, A will opt for a trial (settlement) if LA <
(~) S. As LA = (1- PA)(H +C) and S = LB, this obtains iff PA +
PBH/(H +C) > (~) 1.
3. IfB cannot credibly threaten to litigate, A will engage in his activity as long
as his personal gain G is positive. IfB can credibly threaten to litigate and
the realization of a settlement is the least expensive option for A, A will
engage in the activity if G > S, i.e. iff PB < G/H. If B can credibly
threaten to litigate and a trial is the least expensive option for A, A will
engage in the activity ifG > LA> i.e. iffPA > 1 - G/(H+C).
These results are summarized in figure 3.
Figure 3. The interaction between A and B under legal cost insurance
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In our discussion of the impact of legal cost insurance, we start at those victims
who were subject to a binding credit restriction, but who can take legal proceedings
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now that they are insured. Ifnot insured, these victims could not credibly threaten
to bring suit. The full O-I-square for the probabilities PA and PB in fact constituted
area I. The (potential) injurer felt free to venture upon any harmful activity. If the
(potential) victim is insured, figure 3 applies. Depending on the circumstances, the
victim can now force the injurer to pay a settlement amount (area 11); he has a
chance that damages will be awarded in court (area Ill); or he may even enjoy the
absence of harm, when A decides to abstain from an inefficient activity (area IV).
The position of an insured victim is clearly better than the position of an uninsured
victim.
For our evaluation we must also take a look at the second category of
insured, i.e. those who would have been able to bring suit if uninsured. For this
category, the introduction of legal cost insurance results in an increase in the
expected net benefit of litigation. A comparison of figure 2 and 3 reveals the
implications. First of all, area I disappears, because the expected net benefit of
litigation will be positive for all PB >o. Second, there is an increase in area Ill: the
injurer will more often let a dispute go to trial, because he observes that the
settlement amount increases while his net cost of litigation is unchanged. Finally,
there is an increase in area IV: the injurer will more often refrain from his harmful
activity, because he has to reckon with higher expenses following from these
activities.
3.2 The origin of legal cost insurance
We now must face the question that precedes figure 3. Is legal cost insurance in the
mutual interest of both private insurance companies and (potential) victims? The
standard explanation for the existence of an insurance like this is the risk-aversion
of the (potential) victims. This argument cannot be applied in our model, as it is
based on the assumption that all persons involved are risk-neutral.
But there is another factor at work here, the strategic position of (potential)
victims . We have observed that the fact that a victim is insured improves his
position vis-a-vis the injurer, not only if it really comes to a trial, but also apart
from the actual appearance in a court-room. If injurer A knows that the (potential)
victim B is insured, he will more often abstain from his activities; so B will
experience less harm. Moreover, B will more often be in a position to credibly
threaten to bring suit, and so be able to extort a profitable settlement from A. In
these cases the net benefit to B definitely increases, even if there is no trial and the
corresponding costs to the insurance company are equal to zero.
Of course, there are also cases (area III of figure 3) where the insurance
12
company is confronted with litigation costs. To analyse whether the insurance
policy could represent a mutually beneficial trade in these cases, we must look at
the combined (expected) net benefit of victim and insurance company. If the victim
was legally impotent without the insurance policy, then the combined (expected)
net benefit is definitely positive, at least as long as PB > C/(H +C); similarly, if
the victim was wealthy enough to take judicial proceedings without being insured,
there is no change in the combined (expected) net benefit, but only a redistribution
from insurance company to insured.
The only problem for a mutually beneficial insurance contract occurs when
PB < C/(H +C). Given the litigation costs, a trial would not be worthwhile for B,
ifhe had to bear the full legal costs; but when these legal costs can be shifted to the
insurance company, B's net benefit of litigation changes from negative to positive,
and the case may actually end in a trial (cf. the upper left part of figure 3). If so,
the combined (expected) net benefit of victim and insurance company would be
negative.
However, it is quite likely that the probability distribution of PA's and PBI S
is such that these latter cases do not occur so often that their negative effect on the
combined net benefit of victim and insurance company outweighs the positive (or
zero) effect of all the other possible cases. Then it will prove possible to find a
premium that makes the insurance a mutually beneficial trade. 10
3.3 Efficiency
In discussing the efficiency implications of legal cost insurance, we have to
distinguish victims who cannot credibly threaten to bring suit in absence of legal
cost insurance, and those can.
If an uninsured victim cannot credibly threaten to bring suit, the full 0-1-
square for the probabilities PA and PB in fact constitutes area I. Once insured this
victim may credibly threaten to bring suit. The potential injurer will now abstain
from inefficient activities located in area IV; this is a clear contribution to
efficiency. On the other hand, several conflicts will now end up in court, with the
concomitant costs; from an efficiency point of view this is a deterioration. On
balance, the effect on social welfare can both be positive and negative.
10 It can be shown, for instance, that if the distribution of the probabilities PA and PB
is independently uniform across the O-I-square, and the activity concerned is efficient (G
> H), the advantage to B of being insured would be 3 times the expected costs of the
insurance company; and if the activity is inefficient (G < H) the (relative) difference
would even be higher.
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If an uninsured individual can credibly threaten to bring suit, insurance on
the one hand leads to a growth of area Ill, i.e. more conflicts lead to trial. On the
other hand, it leads to a growth of area IV, i.e. more inefficient activities will be
effectively deterred.
Legal cost insurance may increase efficiency if the welfare gain stemming
from increased deterrence outweighs the welfare loss due to an increase in the
number of trials.
3.4 Private vs public insurance
In the preceding sections we focussed on legal cost insurance, whereby private
insurance companies sell legal cost insurance policies. Risk-neutral potential
victims may be interested in legal cost insurance, because it improves their position
vis-a.-vis the injurer. An alternative may be public insurance: the government may
provide subsidized legal aid. With subsidized legal aid, the victim does not have
to finance the full legal costs CB in order to bring suit. Depending on his income,
he only has to pay a deductible, which will be indicated by DB. The remainder of
B's legal costs, RB = CB - DB' is taken care of by the government. If injurer A
loses in court, he will have to bear all litigation costs, C. In that case B's deductible
will be reimbursed by A, as will the expenses taken care of by the government. If
victim B loses in court, his deductible DB will not be reimbursed; moreover, he has
to pay the legal costs of the winner, CA. In that case B's costs boil down to CA +
DB' which is equal to C - RB. The outcome of the interaction between A and B is
summarized in figure 4. 11
11 In our formulation of the system of subsidized legal aid, we have been inspired by
actual Dutch practice. It is straightforward to find the outcome of the interaction between
A and B. Individual B can credibly threaten to bring suit if PB > (C- RB)/(H +C-RB). If
B credibly threatens to litigate, A will opt for a trial (settlement) if PA +
PB(H +C-RB)/(H +C) > (~) 1 + (C-RB)/(H +C). IfB cannot credibly threaten to litigate,
A will engage in his activity as long as his personal gain G is positive. If B can credibly
threaten to litigate and the realization of a settlement is the least expensive option for A,
A will engage in the activity if PB < (G+C-RB)/(H +C-RB). If B can credibly threaten
to litigate and a trial is the least expensive option for A, A will engage in the activity if PA
> 1 - G/(H +C).
14
Figure 4. The interaction between A and B under subsidized legal aid
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Essentially, public insurance has the same effects as private insurance (cf. figure
2, 3, and 4). Once subsidized legal aid is available to a victim, his expected net
benefit of litigation improves. The subsequent implications are in similar vein as
when the victim is privately insured. And both arrangements help to relieve the
credit restriction of lower income citizens. Notice that the results of figure 3 and
4 would fully coincide if C - RB = O.
Suppose the two arrangements exist side by side. Unless the own
contribution they have to pay in case of legal proceedings comes very much near
the market price for legal assistance, victims who are entitled to legal aid subsidies
in general will not opt for insurance. Low income victims can avoid the insurance
premium by relying on the government provision, which roughly provides them
with the same advantages; on the other hand, there is no noticeable difference in
their personal tax burden when they opt for an alternative to the government
provision. Consequently, low income victims will not buy private legal cost
insurance, unless C - RB is too high. High income victims, on the other hand, who
are not entitled to legal aid subsidies will more often opt for private legal cost
insurance.
From an efficiency point of view it might be argued that there are some
reasons to prefer private insurance to government subsidies, now that there are no
major differences in their effects. These reasons are related to individual freedom
of choice and the funding of the arrangement, and to cost-effectiveness. In case of
private legal cost insurance any (potential) victim can make his own choice as to
whether buying insurance is interesting enough for him; so we can be sure that the
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arrangement only comes into being as the result of a mutually advantageous trade.
In case of legal aid subsidies there is no direct relation between paying for and
calling on the arrangement; so it is very likely that there are people who, if they
had had the choice, would not have bought this "insurance" . Furthermore, there are
people who - because of their incomes - are not entitled to legal aid subsidies and
yet are assessed to pay (efficiency distorting) taxes. As to cost-effectiveness, it may
be surmised that a private insurance company is operating with less X-inefficiency
than a governmental bureaucracy in treating requests for legal assistance. While
these arguments have some value, it nevertheless should be remarked that there are
at least two counterarguments. When (potential) victims after all make the choice
not to buy insurance, and following that decision cannot credibly threaten to bring
suit in case of harm, deterrence is less forceful, and more inefficient activities will
take place in society, than if the government makes a once and for all choice to
introduce a legal aid subsidy scheme. Secondly, and as to cost-effectiveness, there
may be substantial economies of scale and savings on transaction costs involved,
when the government provides the "insurance" through one counter (with one
administration), and on a compulsory basis (without marketing efforts, screening
of candidates, etc.).12
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the interaction between an individual A who considers
whether or not to engage in an activity that causes harm to B, and the individual B
who is legally entitled to damages but may have to take judicial proceedings to
compel A to actually pay. The interaction between A and B can result in four
outcomes: (I) A engages in the activity, and B cannot credibly threaten to litigate;
(11) A engages in the activity, B credibly threatens to litigate, and A makes a
settlement offer which is accepted by B; (Ill) A engages in the activity, B credibly
threatens to litigate, and A allows things to develop into a trial; (IV) A does not
engage in the activity. The outcome in a specific case depends on the values of the
personal gain obtained by the injurer (G), the size of the harm (H), the sum of the
legal costs of A and B (C), and the subjective probabilities of prevailing of both
individuals (PA and PB)·
From a social welfare point of view, ideally an injurer should always feel
urged to settle and pay a full compensation of the harm inflicted on a victim. In that
12 For a similar discussion of the arguments in favour of public versus private
provision of social security, see Aarts and De Jong (1998).
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case, an injurer will only engage in efficient activities, i.e. activities yielding a
personal gain that outweighs the harm. In a world of imperfect information,
however, the interaction may yield two· types of inefficiency. The first one
materializes when a potential injurer engages in an activity that causes harm to a
victim that outweighs the personal gain obtained by the injurer. The second one
obtains when the dispute results in a trial rather than a settlement.
In this paper we concentrated on inefficiencies that originate from the level
of legal costs that may withhold the victim from making a credible threat to bring
suit. If potential victims have an opportunity to buy legal cost insurance, this
problem may be eliminated. It has been shown that legal cost insurance may come
into being even if potential victims are risk-neutral, as being insured strengthens
their strategic position vis-a.-vis potential injurers.
The introduction of legal cost insurance leads to an improvement in the
deterrent function of the law: more inefficient activities will be effectively deterred.
This is a clear contribution to efficiency. On the other hand, a larger number of
activities will now end up in court. Legal cost insurance may increase efficiency
if the welfare gain stemming from increased deterrence outweighs the welfare loss
due to an increase in the number of trials.
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